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The Critical Vulnerabilities of Civilian Nuclear Operations 
 
The exploitation for peaceful purposes of nuclear knowledge and nuclear 
technology is inevitably connected to the exploitation of the same phenomena for military 
purposes.  Moreover, many of the key processes that are at the heart of the civilian 
nuclear industry (particularly, enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel) are at the heart 
of a weapons production programme. If the problem is not to be disposed of by outlawing 
nuclear activities for any purpose, then the critical vulnerabilities of peaceful operations 
need to be identified and measures need to be adopted that offer the greatest assurance 
that such operations are not misused to produce weapons of any kind.  In the light of the 
enormous positive potential of nuclear power in a world threatened with climate change, 
as well as the benefits of nuclear materials in medicine and industry, it will be taken that 
the abolition option is not in the interest of humanity, even if it were viable.  To the 
contrary, it is assumed that nuclear operations will continue to expand in scale and, 
particularly expand to more countries.  The need then is to understand the full range of 
vulnerabilities and identify the widest range of responses and safeguards that may be 
employed.   
The obvious key danger is that fresh states acquire the capability to produce 
weapons grade fissile material and then either covertly employ this technology to make 
weapons, or, at some point, in the future may decide to do so in defiance of their 
undertakings to that point (‘breakout’).  An associated danger is that states that have the 
capability (and perhaps a covert programme) may provide knowledge or material 
(including fissile material) to other states, or even to non-state actors (and, again, in 
defiance of specific undertakings).  There is a third general vulnerability and that is that 
states having such programmes and the associated stocks of material, may fail to 
adequately protect already made-up weapons, weapons-grade fissile material, or, more 
generally, radioactive material that might be the basis of radioactive dispersal devices.  
Of course, these latter dangers apply also to the existing nuclear weapon states (both 
official and unofficial), although in relation to weapons and weapon-grade material it 
might be presumed that states with long experience of nuclear weapon production might 
have evolved more sophisticated systems to protect these things.  Some of these 
vulnerabilities are specifically related to particular processes (like enrichment and 
reprocessing, as noted above), others relate to more general aspects of the nuclear 
industry and attach to the science and the materials that underlie both civilian and 
military operations.  The discussion begins with these non-specific vulnerabilities. 
 
Non-Specific Vulnerabilities 
States that have any significant nuclear activity, even if it is only a research 
reactor, or a small power reactor, or even a nuclear laboratory, acquire a general 
familiarity with things nuclear and a facility for handling nuclear material.  As operations 
grow, with more reactors and, perhaps, the development of ancillary activities, they will 
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develop a cadre of experts and accumulate nuclear material of various kinds.  They will 
also develop relevant non-nuclear technology such as machine tools for precision 
engineering.  At whatever stage it may be, this kind of development represents a non-
specific vulnerability.  States that have made any progress along this path are in a better 
position to start a nuclear weapons programme than those that haven’t.  States, such as 
Japan or Germany, that have the full range of capabilities, have everything they would 
need to make nuclear weapons, should they wish to so; it is only a matter of how long it 
would take.  The principal of bureaucratic prudence suggests that they will also have the 
plans.  The scenario is easy to describe.  The Minister comes into the bureaucrat’s office 
and says, ‘We have decided to make nuclear weapons.  How can it be done?’  The 
bureaucrat envisages two possibilities.  He may say to the Minister, ‘I’m sorry, I have no 
idea.  We haven’t thought about it.’  Or he may reach for the bottom drawer in his desk 
and pull out a file and say, ‘This is what you need to do’.  It is very clear to this writer 
that the perceptive bureaucrat would want to be in a position to make the second 
response, rather than the first. 
This is not to suggest that either of the states mentioned as examples above began 
their civilian nuclear power programmes with the idea of developing nuclear weapons, or 
even that they developed nuclear power in order to acquire general expertise against the 
possibility that they might want to pursue nuclear weapons ambitions at some later stage.  
In the case of Japan it is plausible to believe that the development of nuclear power was a 
response to long-time energy supply anxieties, exacerbated by the oil crises of the early 
1970s.  There have been other cases that were clearly different.  The British programme 
to build nuclear power stations in the late 1940s and early fifties was said at the time to 
be a civilian programme directed at the production of much needed electrical power.  In 
fact, the driver was military.  The purpose of the reactors was to produce plutonium for 
nuclear weapons.  This was a pattern that was repeated in the case of India and (to take 
another example from the writer’s own part of the world) Australia (though in this case 
the programme was aborted at an early stage).1  At the present time, there is a serious 
question about the purposes of the nuclear programme of Iran.  These are said by that 
country to be entirely peaceful and related to a developing civilian nuclear power 
programme.2  On the other hand, Iran’s only civilian nuclear power plant is not yet 
completed (although it is expected to go critical for the first time in 2005).  To be 
building enrichment and reprocessing capability at this stage seems premature and 
scarcely economic, especially since the party constructing the nuclear power plant 
(Russia) has also offered to supply the fuel and to take away spent fuel.  Iran has also 
recently confessed3 to having discussed with a potential supplier the acquisition of 
technologies necessary for the production of nuclear weapons as long ago as 1987.  Some 
of these were not dual use technologies but processes, such as uranium metal casting, 
specific to weapon fabrication. 
 
                                                 
1 The Australian programme was centred on the construction of a series of plutonium production reactors, 
the first of which was to be built at Jarvis Bay in New South Wales.  See Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid 
for the Atomic Bomb, Carlton, Victoria, Melbourne University Press, 2000. 
2 This claim is set out in some detail in a speech by the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister (Dr Gholamali 
Khoshroo) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament on 23 November 2004 (text 
distributed by the Iranian Embassy in Wellington). 
3 New York Times, 28 February 2005. 
 3
Dealing with the risk  
The moral here is plain.  Judgements about proliferation risk, and upon 
appropriate safeguards, must be made on the basis of actions and capabilities not on the 
basis of intentions, stated or implied.  Specific technologies, such as enrichment and 
reprocessing, imply specific capabilities which require appropriate responses (to be 
discussed further below).  The non-specific risks that arise from general possession of 
nuclear material and technology, just have to be accepted.  Something between these two 
is represented by what happened in regard to Taiwan and South Korea during 2004.  In 
both countries, evidence had been found or disclosed of earlier experimentation with 
sensitive technologies4.  In the Korean case, there had been experimentation (in 2000) 
with laser technology that had resulted in the production of a few milligrams of enriched 
uranium.  This had not been reported to the IAEA, or the Korean Government at the time 
but had been revealed in the context of Korea’s acceptance of the additional protocols.5  
In the Taiwan case, rumours of plutonium separation experiments in the 1980s resurfaced 
following a newspaper editorial exploring the virtues of a nuclear arsenal to deter 
Chinese use of force against the island.6  There are separable issues here.  It needs to be 
noted that the activities in question are ended (in one case nearly 20 years ago) and that 
as far as South Korea was concerned the matter was freely acknowledged, and that South 
Korea is now bound to the additional protocol regime.  In the light of this, it is important 
not to overreact and inhibit the impulse to transparency.  The words of Professor Eun 
Cheol Lee (of Seoul National University) in reference to the South Korean experiments 
are also of interest.  He talks of ‘some curious researchers’ and, incidentally, claims that 
what was done was not at the time subject to compulsory reporting.7  Enthusiastic 
scientists are going to be curious and they are going to want to satisfy that curiosity.  On 
the other hand, other commentators point out that the chosen enrichment method (laser 
separation) is so expensive that it is hard to believe that this ‘curiosity’ was able to be 
indulged without some official support8.  Either way, the incident points up the general 
non-specific vulnerability that attaches to nuclear activity, however peaceful its 
ostensible purpose.  Obviously, there are general precautions that can be taken in the 
context of a comprehensive safeguards system (and these seem to have been effective in 
the Taiwan and South Korea cases) but the non-specific vulnerability will remain. 
 
 
Specific vulnerabilities of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle 
 
These may be at the front end or the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle and they 
may relate to sensitive material or sensitive processing capability.  At the front end they 
mainly attach to the process of enrichment and prior uranium hexafluoride manufacture.  
                                                 
4 Of course, these are by no means the only states to have been suspected of this and the recently uncovered 
activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, suggest that there might be quite a few parties who have 
been interested in this sort of experimentation.  (See, for example, William Broad and David Sanger, ‘As 
Nuclear Secrets Emerge in Khan Inquiry, More Are Suspected’, New York Times, 26 December 2004.) 
5 IAEA Press Release 2004/08 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter) 
6 ‘Taiwan May Have Experimented With Atomic Bomb Ingredient’, New York Times, October 14, 2004. 
7 TCNC Newsletter, September/October 2004, Page 3 
8 In November 2004 the IAEA announced that it would be sending a team of investigators to Korea to make 
further inquiries. 
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At the back end proliferation anxieties centre on the accumulation of plutonium in spent 
fuel and on the existence of plant capable of reprocessing spent fuel.  In both cases there 
is the capacity to covertly produce weapons grade material and thus the possibility that 
nuclear weapons are made or that material or technology is passed on to third parties who 
may themselves produce weapons.  There is also the danger that states that have some 
level of nuclear activity may covertly develop the proliferation-sensitive technologies.  
The traditional way of dealing with this problem has been the IAEA safeguards regime 
which follows on from the almost universal adherence by states of the world to the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Under this, parties to the treaty lay their nuclear 
activities open to monitoring and inspection so that it can be verified that they are not 
engaged in proscribed activities. 
 
Safeguards 
One answer to present concerns about proliferation is to further strengthen the 
safeguards regime.  This would involve a renewed effort to get the 40 or so states that are 
not yet in compliance with their treaty obligations to deposit the appropriate documents 
and make the appropriate arrangements.  It would also involve getting all those states that 
have, or are acquiring, sensitive technologies to sign up for the additional protocols and, 
as the IAEA Secretary General said in September 2004, not taking ‘no’ for an answer.  
It is undoubtedly true that full compliance from all parties would provide a high 
degree of assurance, not only in regard to enrichment and reprocessing activities but also 
in the difficult area of illicit transfers of material and technology; but there are a number 
of obvious problems with this as the sole solution.  With the likely expansion of 
capability (for existing players) and the very likely extension of nuclear power activities 
to fresh states, the demand for IAEA monitoring capacity is going to increase 
enormously, perhaps unacceptably so, if there is a proportional increase of new entrants 
into the more sensitive technologies.  This will place a particular strain if there are 
widespread and persistent efforts to cheat on the system.  In such cases additional 
measures of surveillance are likely to be required in addition to the protocol regime, to 
ensure compliance.  ‘This would include short notice access to go anywhere, and 
interview anyone, at anytime without restrictions and to allow agency inspectors to use 
their own equipment.’9 
 
Problems 
There is some debate about how well such a system can work.  On the one hand: 
The Iraq experience has demonstrated that inspections – while 
requiring time and patience – can be effective even when the country 
under inspection is providing less than active cooperation.10 
On the other: ‘sanctions have not proven to be a workable solution, and in many 
cases simply serve as a catalyst for clandestine nuclear programmes’.11  A glance at the 
footnotes here will show that this is the same speaker (IAEA Director General Mohamed 
                                                 
9 Pierre Goldschmidt, IAEA Deputy Director General, 22 June 2004 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/) 
10 Address by IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, to Pugwash Conference in Seoul, 7 October 
2004.  (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/) 
11 IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, opening international expert group meeting on nuclear fuel 
cycle, 10 September 2004.  (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/)  
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ElBaradei) in speeches less than a month apart.  Of course, he may have been thinking of 
different cases and there are clearly many variables here but it is surely evident that the 
safeguards system is an invitation for the unscrupulous to play games with the 
international community.  The IAEA has been fooled in the past and it is likely to be 
fooled again.  It certainly seems that in the case of Iraq a combination of persistent 
sanctions and a comprehensive inspection regime over many years produced a situation 
in which that country was unable to actively pursue its nuclear ambitions.  On the other 
hand, it needs to be remembered that this was only confirmed after the 2003 invasion and 
the fall of Saddam Hussein and that before the invasion most experts were still speaking 
of doubts and unresolved questions.  It also needs to be noted that, at almost the same 
time, it emerged that Libya had been pursuing a nuclear weapons programme that was 
undetected by the safeguards system. 
 
Breakout 
There is yet another factor.  Even the additional protocol regime cannot guard 
against ‘breakout’.  A state which has a substantial enrichment facility could simply 
repudiate its commitments, remove monitoring equipment and refuse further visits from 
IAEA inspectors.  It could then adjust the mode of operation of the facility so that instead 
of producing (say) 4% uranium 235, it produced 90+% for weapon manufacture12.  In the 
case of a typical centrifugal cascade system this might take a couple of weeks.  There 
would presumably be no shortage of the uranium hexafluoride feedstock (although this is 
another sensitive technology subject to safeguard).  Similar considerations would apply in 
the case of states that had a reactor that was capable of producing weapons grade 
plutonium  (one that could be refuelled without shutting down and thus capable of 
permitting short burnups of the nuclear fuel) and/or reprocessing technology that would 
permit the separation of plutonium, thus produced.13  The only restraint on the further 
development of a nuclear weapons programme based on either of these pathways would 
then be only world opinion.  This is the same force that must oblige states not in 
compliance with their NPT obligations to become so.  The crucial question is, to what 
extent can we rely upon this?  Clearly for some states that already have a full range of 
capabilities (like Germany or Japan), the esteem of other states is very important to them 
so that dishonest practice, or the open repudiation of solemn undertakings would have a 
high price.  The same may not apply to what have sometimes been called ‘pariah’ states; 
states that are already in bad odour for other reasons (Myanmar and North Korea spring 
to mind as examples of this case).  More generally, there is a need to face the realities of 
world politics.  Issues like this are not determined by international bodies on a strict 
objective assessment of what even-handed justice and fairness would require.  They are 
also determined on the basis of interest and advantage.  The line-up of major players in 
relation to the ongoing Iran saga, illustrates this very well.  China’s support for Iran’s 
position is easily defended on the basis of Iran’s (albeit sometimes tardy) acceptance of 
                                                 
12 Covert alteration whilst under full safeguards is rendered problematic by the possibility of short notice 
inspection.  It could be further guarded against by remote monitoring of process lines, as suggested by 
Arian Pregenzer of Sandia National Laboratories in a paper prepared for an international meeting in China 
(and privately provided to the present author). 
13 The Canadian CANDU reactor, which also has the advantage of working on unenriched fuel, is very 
relevant here. 
 6
IAEA demands but it is also very understandable in the light of China’s acute need for oil 
and gas to support its rapidly growing economy. 
 
NPT Anomalies 
There is also the vexed problem of the few NPT standout states that already have 
nuclear weapons (Israel, India and Pakistan).  As matters presently stand they cannot be 
admitted to the NPT as nuclear weapon states, and they cannot be admitted as non-
nuclear weapon states unless they give up their weapons (which in their present security 
circumstances they are very unlikely to do).  The downside of this is that these states 
cannot be embraced in the IAEA safeguards regime and be full parties in, for example, 
nuclear export control measures.  In a 2004 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
Cohen and Graham suggest that this might be rectified by establishing a form of associate 
membership of the NPT through a ‘free standing agreement or protocol’.14  Whether this 
is a politically viable proposal, the fact remains that the anomalous situation of these 
states is a weakness in global efforts to control proliferation and will remain so until it is 
rectified.  A tentative conclusion at this point is that safeguards, even enhanced, may not 
be enough.  It is thus essential to consider other ways of dealing with the proliferation 
problem.   
 
Restricted Access to Sensitive Technologies 
An obvious alternative which may also deal with some of the problems identified 
above is to establish a pattern of international cooperation which would control access to 
particularly sensitive technologies.  This end may be achieved by the cooperative 
establishment, for this purpose, of internationally owned and operated facilities, or 
through the licensing of particular existing providers (or both).  In either case, the essence 
of the proposal is that beyond these two categories, the establishment or operation of 
sensitive nuclear technologies would not be permitted and suppliers of relevant 
technology would be forbidden to supply services other than to authorised operators.15  
Such a regime would have a number of other virtues beyond proliferation control.  By 
taking advantages of economies of scale, it should be able to supply enrichment, 
reprocessing, or spent fuel storage more cheaply than could be provided by national 
operations, particularly in the case of smaller players and newer entrants to nuclear 
operations.  Indeed, such a scheme must offer substantial financial inducements to parties 
that were not permitted to have their own facilities to compensate them for opportunities 
thus forgone. As far as the backend of the fuel cycle is concerned, international 
cooperation could also provide for more optimal environments for repository 
construction.  Concentrating on a smaller number of internationally monitored facilities 
would also simplify and reduce the work of the IAEA safeguards inspectorate. 
The simplest way of approaching such a regime would be to internationalise 
existing facilities, supposing that the countries involved were willing.  Britain, France 
and Russia already have substantial reprocessing capability which they might be 
persuaded to open to a wider range of customers with the caveat that certain monitoring 
                                                 
14 Avner Cohen & Thomas Graham Jr, ‘An NPT for non-members’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
May/June 2004, pages 40-44. 
15 This is the central thrust of the February 2005 International Expert Group report, ‘Multilateral 
Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle’ (MNAs). 
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mechanisms were put in place.  Similarly, the United States and China have plans for 
spent fuel/high level waste repository construction, which in the case of the US are quite 
far advanced.  It may be that they could be persuaded to expand on present plans to take 
material from overseas.  A consideration that lies behind these suggestions is, of course, 
that these five states are the five ‘official’ nuclear weapon states.  The fact that spent fuel 
goes to any one of them for reprocessing or long term sequestration is thus not a direct 
proliferation risk.  For the most part these countries are already flush with weapons grade 
material.  In the case of the first three, they also have substantial MOX fabrication 
capability.  If this latter consideration was thought important, enrichment and fuel 
fabrication activity could also be limited in the same way.  All five NWS have the 
relevant plant.  So of course, do many non-NWS and this would be the core of the most 
obvious and cogent objection to the proposal.  It would be an egregious restraint of trade 
and a clear interference in the sovereign rights of a state.  (Further general objections to 
any form of internationalised monopoly of parts of the nuclear fuel cycle will be 
considered together below.) 
 
Approved Suppliers 
The proposal for international cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle may be 
broadened in two ways.  The range of approved suppliers of sensitive nuclear services 
could be widened beyond the five NWS to a range of existing providers, with a proven 
record of operation and with the additional protocol regime already in place.  Apart from 
those already named, this would include, for example Japan and Germany.  In the case of 
the latter there is already in existence a deep underground repository for high-level waste 
that is ready to go (at Gorlaben).  Staying in Europe, Finland also has well-advanced 
plans for a similar repository.  Front end facilities, particularly, are widely available 
around the world.  The problem would be to determine where, if anywhere, the cut-off is 
to be made.  The weakest position would be to accept that all present facilities could be, 
in principal, accepted as approved international facilities.  On the plus side, such a 
designation would require acceptance of the full slate of safeguards (perhaps with some 
additional measures to provide for the ‘international’ component).  On the other side, 
such a regime would have enormous implications for the IAEA inspectorate.  Again, why 
should existing capabilities be favoured over those that are being built or planned?  It 
seems obvious that the wider the range of capabilities that is accepted, the weaker would 
be the counter-proliferation potential of the scheme.  The crucial question here is, what 
are the prospects for international agreement along these lines? 
 
Purpose-built cooperative facilities 
There is another way to look at the notion of establishing international facilities 
and that is to plan and construct entirely new facilities, employing the most advanced and 
safest systems, and to situate these facilities in the most appropriate places.  This was the 
concept advanced (in relation to spent fuel storage) by Dunn and Carey in 199816 and 
then taken up as a commercial proposition by Pangea Resources.  Pangea surveyed the 
whole globe for suitable sites on the basis of highly plausible criteria and then came 
                                                 
16 Lewis A Dunn and Stephen Carey, ‘Internationalising Spent Fuel Storage: Concepts, Issues and 
Options’, McLean, Virginia, Science Applications International Corporation, 1998. 
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down in favour of a site in Western Australia17.  The project had an unfortunate start in 
that it was leaked to antinuclear interests before it could be officially announced.  The 
company eventually went into voluntary hibernation after several years of attempting to 
explain what was proposed and what its value might be to the Australian economy.  The 
more recent difficulties that the Australian government has had in getting agreement for 
the site of a modest low and intermediate waste national repository, anywhere on the 
continent, suggest that the possibilities for rational public debate on such matters in 
Australia may not have improved.  More generally, as long as nuclear activities are seen 
as an imposition on a community and not an opportunity, it is going to be difficult to 
convince such communities that they should accommodate them.  This is going to be 
particularly true in the case of countries that do not have nuclear capabilities of their own.  
This suggests that if new international facilities are to be built they will be built in 
countries that already have such an industry.  Such countries will also be likely to have 
available the skilled labour force and the support industries.18 
 
Restraint on Trade 
There are two aspects to the international cooperation project.  One is persuading 
states to service international needs and, perhaps, build additional plant.  With the 
possible exception of accepting foreign waste for long term storage (where simplistic 
arguments about taking other people’s rubbish are apt to seem persuasive) there may not 
be too much difficulty with this, although issues of safe transportation are bound to be 
raised. It also has to be noted that any proposal for international cooperation will entail 
more movement of nuclear material and that may provoke those states (like the writer’s 
own), without significant industrial nuclear activity but with a carefully cultivated 
capacity for nuclear phobia.  Much more significant than this, though, is the difficulty of 
persuading the international community (and particularly the states that are affected) that 
access to certain technologies must be restricted to only some of those states that have or 
might have a nuclear power industry.  Not only might this be seen as a restraint of trade 
and an interference with sovereign rights (as noted above) but it may also appear as a 
repudiation of article IV(1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding the 
‘inalienable right of all parties … to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination’.  Similarly, suggestions that 
enrichment and reprocessing plants should be limited to those states that presently 
possess them and that the Nuclear Suppliers Group should ‘refuse to supply enrichment 
and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already have full-
scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants’ would seem to conflict with the 
article IV(2) right to ‘the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’.  More 
particularly, states that did not have (say) their own enrichment and fuel fabrication 
                                                 
17 Other suitable sites (chosen on the basis of geology, climate and landform) were identified in Argentina, 
Namibia and Northwest China.  The last of these is of particular interest, since it is the site also chosen by 
the Chinese government for a national repository.  This fact is what lay behind the suggestion, above, of 
China as a possible location for an internationally monitored facility. 
18 The February 2005 IAEA report (footnote 15, above) notes that in the case of some sensitive 
technologies  (e.g. reprocessing) the demand is such that there would be no need for the establishment of 
MNAs for some time. 
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capability might see themselves to be in a weakened position.19  They might fear that 
their essential supplies of fuel might be cut-off, or that continuation of supply could be 
used as a diplomatic lever.  As IAEA Director General, Mohamed  ElBaradei, 
emphasised in an address to a Pugwash meeting in October 2004, any scheme for the 
multilateral control of the ‘sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle’ must also guarantee 
the reliability of supply to legitimate would-be users.20   
These considerations suggest that there must be a multiplicity of service suppliers.  
This would also ensure price competition which should mean that the cost of these 
various services would be significantly less than it would be if the customer were to do it 
on his own (quite apart from a subsidy system that might be necessary to induce 
acceptance).  The issue as far as fairness is concerned is simply that these limited 
cooperative arrangements ‘would further entrench the discrimination against non-nuclear-
weapon states’ by apparently entrenching the privileges of NWS, who, in the eyes of 
many, are already failing to live up to their obligations under NPT. 
There is another side to all this and that is that many of the major players are 
already significantly dependent on overseas suppliers, even for crucial services.  For 
example both South Korea and Taiwan have a substantial nuclear power generation 
industry without any enrichment capability of their own.  Again, the establishment of 
cooperative international waste facilities could be seen as an enormous boon for states 
having difficulty (for whatever reason) in finding suitable repository sites. 
 
Special Uses 
Any arrangement for multilateral control of enrichment technology will also have 
to take account of civilian but high enrichment uses.  These include highly enriched fuels 
for research reactors and for marine propulsion systems.  In both cases enrichments have 
historically been as high as 90% (i.e. they are weapons grade without further 
enhancement) and even where this is not so (nuclear submarines have more typically 
used fuels of 20-45% enrichment) a potential proliferator having access to such material 
is given a very substantial head-start in the production of weapons grade material.  
Already some effort is being made to convert research reactors that operate on highly 
enriched fuels to operate at lower enrichments.  This needs to be accelerated.  The case of 
nuclear submarine fuel is different.  Here, higher enrichments are linked to crucial 
operating desiderata.  There is also the military security aspect.  It may be quite 
unrealistic to expect that a state would accept that fuel for its naval forces had to be 
sourced from an international provider.  At the moment this is academic as far as nuclear 
proliferation is concerned since all present operators of nuclear submarines are also 
nuclear weapon states but this isn’t necessarily a situation that can be assumed to 
continue.  It is conceivable that a state might judge that the development of a nuclear 
submarine fleet was in its security interest and might then claim the right for a national 
enrichment capability to provide fuel for that fleet.  There is another possibility: trends in 
the cost of oil may reverse the economic disadvantage that has inhibited the development 
of civilian nuclear propulsion.  If this were to happen there would be a demand for 
                                                 
19 These sentiments were expressed in the Newsletter of the Republic of Korea Technology Centre for 




special fuels and this would constitute a significant vulnerability if there were not a 
general acceptance that any such fuels would only be supplied by specialist facilities 
under international control. 
 
The Impact of Technological Development 
The argument to this point has concerned institutional control with regard to 
established technologies but there are other technologies (actual or conceivable) that 
could transform the proliferation vulnerability situation both positively and negatively.  
On the positive side there is some potential for reducing the possibilities for diversion by 
minimising, or eliminating altogether, the stage in conventional (PUREX) reprocessing, 
at which separated plutonium is accumulated.  In France separated plutonium is produced 
in La Hague and then transported several hundred kilometres to Marcoule where it is 
incorporated into MOX fuel.  All other things being equal, this is a more vulnerable 
situation than that which exists at the THORP plant in the United Kingdom, where the 
separated plutonium passes straight on through the wall to the MOX fabrication plant. 
  There is also the possibility of re-‘contaminating’ separated plutonium with 
some of the relatively short-lived isotopes removed earlier in the process, so as to make 
the material unsuitable for weapons production but still viable as reactor fuel.  Of course, 
the cost here would be that you would have a material that was more dangerous (through 
its higher radioactivity) to the process workers who have to handle it (though no more 
dangerous than spent fuel, presumably).  Also relevant here would be the fast reactor plus 
pyro-processing technology, developed by the Argonne National Laboratory, in which 
the spent fuel is never separated from the other transuranics and in which reprocessing is 
also done on site. 
In relation to the sensitive process of uranium enrichment, there are both positive 
and negative possibilities.  The present dominant enrichment methods are the older 
gaseous diffusion technique and the newer centrifugal system.  Typically these entail 
large plants, which are big users of energy and, thus, are activities that it is not easy to 
conceal (this is particularly true of gaseous diffusion technology).   This fact makes a 
monitoring and safeguards regime easier to operate, although it does not guard against 
breakout.  As far as this possibility is concerned, it may be that investigations could be 
undertaken to devise a system of engineered barriers which would prevent covert 
modification (of the kind envisaged earlier) and make alteration of the plant extremely 
difficult and time-consuming, even in a breakout situation.  The latter case would also 
provide a longer period during which negotiations could proceed to prevent the intended 
fissile material production from going ahead.   
Another highly significant technology to consider is laser separation.  In theory 
this could provide an alternative enrichment technique which is less energy intensive and 
which allows separation in a single pass, as opposed to the multiple passes involved in 
gaseous diffusion or centrifugal methods.  Separation technologies based on laser 
activation may permit smaller scale operation and may be less energy intensive and thus 
easier to conceal.  In these respects, laser technology may present a particular 
proliferation challenge, despite the fact that many of the major players (France, United 
States, Japan) appear to have abandoned development in this area on grounds of 
‘economic feasibility’ (and, perhaps, also because of its proliferation implications?).  On 
the other hand, Russia seems to have supplied AVLIS (Atomic Vapour Laser Isotope 
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Separation) technology to Iran (and, perhaps, to others).  The fact that it is uneconomic is, 
of course, of no significance to a party determined on nuclear weapon production.21  
More speculatively, it may be that other laser separation techniques may be developed 
that might (say) enable the separation of plutonium isotopes, so that high burn-up fuels 
containing as little as 60% plutonium-239 may be converted into a more weapons-
suitable material by enrichment22  This sort of possibility would also have the potential to 




There is a general conclusion to be drawn from all this: technological 
developments together with a determination to succeed on the part of a would-be 
proliferator will always have the potential to defeat the most careful of counter-
proliferation measures.  Holding the line here (preventing the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by further states) will require a modicum of good faith as well as an elaborate 
system of safeguards and a determination by the international community to insist on the 
specific adherence by all parties to their commitments under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty.  Failing this, it is hard to see how unilateral action by parties that see 
themselves as particularly threatened, can be ruled out — and that is a most 
uncomfortable conclusion. 
As far as restricting the sensitive technologies is concerned, it is interesting to 
note that the IAEA International Expert Group is effectively proposing a Grand Bargain 
under which Nuclear Weapon States and non-NPT states would agree to give up their 
rights to operate reprocessing and enrichment plants to produce nuclear explosive 
material and in return Non Nuclear Weapon States would agree to a limitation in their 
rights to have certain sensitive technologies under national control.  Under this 
arrangement, multilateral facilities would be the norm.23 
 
 
End-note on Iran’s Nuclear Programme 
The present situation of Iran illustrates a particularly difficult set of problems as 
far as non-proliferation is concerned.  In the first place, it has to be recognised that, under 
international law, Iran has a perfect right to whatever ‘peaceful’ nuclear technology it 
believes it needs and that the international community has no right to attempt to prevent 
the development by Iraq of such technology.  Apart from anything else, these ‘rights’ are 
specifically proclaimed in the NPT, to which Iran and almost all other countries in the 
world are parties.  Provided that Iran binds itself to all the appropriate safeguards and 
fully cooperates with the associated monitoring and inspection programme there are, on 
the face of it, no grounds to deny any technology that Iran believes it needs.   
                                                 
21 DEBKAfile (28 August 2003) reports that AVLIS technology has been installed at Nantaz and, 
underground, at Moallen Kalayeh in the Albroz Mountains 40Km north of Tehran. 
22 It is understood that some nuclear weapon-design experts claim that even the isotopic mix resulting from 
high burn-up in the common style of light-water reactor can be used in a nuclear explosive device.  In the 
view of this writer this claim is based on a number of very problematic assumptions.  It is also noted that no 
would-be proliferator has thus far actually tried to go this way. 
23 ‘Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, IAEA, February 2005, page 12 (paragraph 39) 
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On the other hand, there are substantial grounds for Iran to consider self-denial in 
the matter of the most sensitive technologies, at least for the time being.24  Its neighbours 
and, indeed, the world community have good grounds for concern.  At the present stage 
of its nuclear development, Iran does not need enrichment, fuel fabrication and 
reprocessing technologies. The government and official spokesman may insist that their 
intentions are entirely peaceful but there are other voices and other actions.  Iran is 
devoting increasing amounts of money to its medium and long range missile programme 
and this programme makes most sense if the intended payloads are nuclear, rather than 
conventional.  Also, Dr Hassan Abasi, theoretician of Revolutionary Guards Intelligence 
and adviser to Iranian Leader, Ali Khamenei has been quoted as saying: 
We have a strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon 
civilisation and for the uprooting of the Americans and the English.  Our 
missiles are now ready to strike … at their cities and their installations.25  
In the light of this, it is understandable that neighbours (including Israel), as well 
as the wider western world, continue to be anxious.  That anxiety could be much relieved 
by a policy of voluntary restraint on the part of Iran and such a policy would have little 
cost (apart from a perceived loss of face), given that Iran’s nuclear programme is ‘strictly 
and exclusively energy-oriented’26.  It also might be that Iran could determine that the 
preservation of the NPT was in its interest.   
Given Iran’s clear and repeated repudiation of any nuclear weapon ambitions, the 
crucial question is: what would be the disadvantage to Iran of deciding not to go further 
with its present development of sensitive technology?  As noted earlier in the general 
discussion, it could certainly point to uncertainties in fuel supplies and some vulnerability 
in the matter of cost.  Again, as noted, there are ways of dealing with this that could offer 
security and cost advantage. This is where the focus of discussion between Iran and the 
international community ought to be.  
The disadvantage that could not be offset would be the one that arose from Iran’s 
incapacity to develop nuclear weapons (having relinquished the means), if it at some 
point in the future it chose to do so.  In this way it would lose the potential deterrent 
effect of possessing such an arsenal.  It is a moot question how much of a loss this would 
really be, in terms of the security of Iran.  On the one hand, it might seem that an (even 
minimally) nuclear armed Iran would be invulnerable to the sort of regime change that 
has recently been imposed on Afghanistan and Iraq.  On the other hand, a plausible 
deterrence posture would seem to require an indisputable capability to strike with 
unacceptable consequences at any party that struck it.  This might apply generally to 
neighbouring states (except Israel) at an early stage but it would not apply to the United 
States for a very long time.  In the interim, Iran might seem to have increased its 
vulnerability to pre-emptive strike.  Having regard to the political/moral/tactical 
difficulties of such an undertaking, the likelihood of this is small but, perhaps, not 
negligibly so.  From a security point of view, therefore, it represents a palpable disvalue. 
If Iran did not agree to forgo these sensitive technologies and went ahead with 
enrichment and reprocessing, other questions would arise.  Given that Iran could not be 
                                                 
24 There are precedents for this.  The Republic of Korea does not have enrichment or reprocessing 
capability, notwithstanding a very substantial nuclear power industry with some 18 operating reactors. 
25 MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis, Number 181- Iran, page 3. 
26 Khoshroo, page 1 (see footnote 2) 
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persuaded, what would be the prospects of urging similar restraints on others, either in 
the context of a general plan for cooperative but restrictive development of such 
technologies, or as another one-off?  ‘Small’, one would have thought27. 
What would be the plan in the case of Iran or any other nuclear aspirant state in 
the event that full safeguards were not agreed, or full access was not maintained, or that 
illegal activities were detected?  How likely is an agreement on referral to the Security 
Council and the adoption of sanctions, and how likely is it that such sanctions as were 
adopted would be effective?  If the answer to these latter questions is, ‘not very’, we have 
a problem. 
Dr Ron Smith 




27 This, of course, is not academic.  At present Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and Vietnam are proposing to 
build nuclear power reactors.  Given that, why should they not insist on their ‘right’ to develop the 
associated, sensitive technologies?  
